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CHARLES E. CARPENTER
IN GENEAL
(a) In Early English Law. The early English cases in
restraint of trade are actions upon covenants in bonds by which
the obligor agreed not to exercise his trade in a more or less
restricted territory. These cases seem to make no point of the
narrowness of the restriction either as to space or time, but treat
all such covenants as void. Thus a condition in a bond by the
defendant not to use his art of a dyer's craft within the plaintiff's
town for half a year was held invalid, the court saying, "And
per Dieu, if the plaintiff were here he should go to prison until
he paid a fine to the King."' Other early cases holding such
covenants void are the Blacksmith's case,2 where one blacksmith
agreed with another of the same town not to carry on his trade
within the town; Colgate v. Bacheler,3 where a haberdasher
agreed that for a period of four years he would not carry on his
trade in the county of Kent; and an anonymous case 4 where an
apprentice at the time of his apprenticeship agreed not to employ
his craft for four years at Nottingham.
Not only did the early cases attach no importance to the
narrowness or the generality of the restriction, but they made no
distinction as to whether the contract was a bare one not to com-
pete, or was made as part of a contract for a term of employment,
or as ancillary to the sale of a business. The reasons for holding
contracts not to engage in a trade or employment void were not
stated in the early cases, but the objections to such covenants are
not difficult to surmise when it is remembered that at that time
there were few trades a man could follow without having been
duly apprenticed, and that there were perhaps no other trades in
which he was competent; and when it is remembered that follow-
'Anonymous, Y. B. 2 Hen. V, pl. 26 (1415).
'2 Leo. 210, 3 Leo. 217 (1587).
ICro. Eliz., 872 (I5g6).
'Moore 115 (1578).
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ing the Great Plague, which carried off so many workmen and
servants, the Statute of Laborers 5 was passed in 1349, requiring
every able-bodied person under sixty years of age "not living in
merchandise nor exercising any craft, nor having of his own
whereof he may live, nor proper land about whose tillage he may
himself occupy and not serving any other," to serve him that
required it, under penalty of being committed to gaol. Under
these conditions it is apparent that an agreement not to carry on
a trade or to refrain from competing with the covenantee might
have greatly injured the covenantor by divesting him of his only
means of earning a livelihood; and it might have been in effect
an agreement to violate the Statute of Laborers.
The earliest case which the writer has found sustaining an
agreement not to exercise a trade is that of Rogers v. Parry,6
where the defendant was held liable in assumpsit upon an agree-
ment not to carry on his trade as a joiner in a shop, which was
demised to him, for twenty-one years. But it does not appear
that the plaintiff lessor placed this restriction upon the use of the
shop by the defendant to prevent him from competing with a
business which he retained, hence the interest which the plaintiff
sought to protect may have been only the peaceful enjoyment of
the house in which he continued to live, the shop leased being
merely parcel of the house.
But the English courts early supported agreements not to
compete where they were part of a sale of property or a business,
and were appropriate as a protection of the property or business
retained or sold and where the restraints imposed upon the cove-
nantor were narrow and not general. Thus we find in 162o acourt
upholding a promise not to keep shop in Newport, made by the
defendant, a shopkeeper, as part of a sale of all of his wares to the
plaintiff, who kept a shop nearby, selling similar wares. 7 And so
a promise by the defendant not to carry on her trade in Bassing-
tooke was supported where the promise was made as a part of de-
fendant's assignment to the plaintiff of her shop as part considera-
523 Edw. III (349).
'2 Bulst. 136 (1613).
'Broad v. Jollyfe, Cro. Jac. 596 (1620).
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tion of a marriage between the plaintiff and her daughter.8 The
first case to go extensively into the reasons for holding contracts
not to compete valid where made a part of a sale of a business was
Mitchel v. Reynolds.9 In that case the defendants assigned to the
plaintiff the lease of a bakeshop for a term of five years, during
which they agreed not to exercise the trade of baker in the parish.
Among the reasons which the court gave in its examination of
the subject for contracts not to compete being held invalid were
that such covenants, if enforcible, would deprive the covenantor
of the means of livelihood, his family of subsistence, and the pub-
lic of a useful member. It also mentioned as an objection the
tendency which such covenants had to produce a monopoly.10
(b) Partial and General Restraints. The distinction taken
in Mitchel v. Reynolds holding all general restraint void and par-
ticular or partial restraints valid if upon a good and adequate
consideration, or, as is expressed in the later cases, "if reason-
able," persisted in the English law until after 1870. In Ward v.
Byrne," the defendant gave a bond to the plaintiff, a coal mer-
chant in London, by which, after reciting that the plaintiff, at the
request of the defendant, had received and taken the defendant
into his service in the capacity of town-traveller and collecting
clerk, it was conditioned inter alia that the defendant should not,
within two years after leaving the plaintiff's service, solicit or sell
to any customers of the plaintiff; that he should not follow or be
' Prugnell v. Goss, Aleyn 67 (1648).
9 1 P. Wins. 18I (II).
The court said: "The true reasons for the distinction upon which the
judgments in these cases of voluntary restraints are founded are, first, the mis-
chief which may arise from them, first to the party by the loss of his livelihood
and the subsistence of his family, and secondly to the public, by depriving it of
an useful member. Another reason is the great abuses these voluntary restraints
are liable to; as for instance, from corporations who are perpetually laboring for
exclusive advantages in trade, and to reduce it into as few hands as possible;
as likewise from masters, who are apt to give their apprentices much vexation
on this account, and to use many indirect practices to procure such bonds from
them, lest they should prejudice them in their custom, when they come to set
up for themselves. Thirdly, because in a great many instances, they can be of
no use to the obligee; which holds in all cases of general restraint throughout
England; for what does it signify to a tradesman in London, what another does
at Newcastle? And surely it would be unreasonable to fix a certain loss on one
side, without any benefit to the other." Supra note 9, at I9o.
15 M. & W. 549 (1839).
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employed in the business of a coal merchant for nine months after
he should have left the employment of the plaintiff; and that he
should not leave his employment without giving a month's notice.
It was held on motion in arrest of judgment that the bond was
void, on the ground that this was in restraint of trade unlimited
in point of space; the court saying, "But when a general restric-
tion limited only as to time is imposed, the public are altogether
losers for that time of the services of the individual, and do not
derive any benefit whatever in return; and looking at the authori-
ties cited upon this subject, it does not appear that there is one
clear authority in favour of a total restriction on trade, limited
only as to time . . It seems to me, therefore, that there is
no authority in favor of the position that there can be a general
restridtion, limited only as to time, and that this case falls within
the rule laid down by Tindal, C. J., viz., that this is a general pro-
hibition against carrying on trade, which is more extensive than
the interests of the party with whom the contract is made can
possibly require." And in Allsopp v. Wheatcroft,12 where a clerk
covenanted that he would not during his service or within two
years afterward sell any Burton ale or beer other than that brewed
by the plaintiffs, it was held the covenant was void as being too
extensive, the court saying, "No doubt, in the case of Leather
Cloth Company v. Lorsont, Lord justice (then Vice-Chancellor)
James threw some doubt on the existence of a hard and fast rule
which makes a covenant in restraint of trade invalid if unlimited
in area; but there were expressions in the instrument in that case
limiting the generality of the covenant, and it was in substance a
case of a different class from this. . . . Assenting, as I do,
to everything that was said in Leather Cloth Company v. Lorsont,
I can hardly treat it as authorizing me to depart from the recog-
nized rule as to limitation of space in a case so different from it
as the present is, and unless that rule be departed from, the cove-
nant here is clearly bad."
The court further said, "It seems to me that, according to
the view taken in the cases, it could not have been held necessary
for the plaintiffs' protection to prevent the defendant from solicit-
" L. R. is Eq. 59 01872).
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ing orders for the ale of other Burton brewers in places where
Burton ale had never been sold or heard of, and probably, as
Mr. Pearson argued, the covenant would, even within the limits
where Allsopp's. company had customers, prevent lawful acts of
the defendant which would not injure the plaintiff. I am bound
by the authorities to hold the covenant inoperative independently
of any absolute rule requiring a limitation of area." 13 However,
the rule that the covenant not to compete shall be limited as to
space was slowly absorbed in the rule of reasonableness, gradually
growing in favor. Under this the test for determining the valid-
ity of the covenant is whether the restraint is wider than is neces-
sary to protect the promisee in the property or business sold or
retained. In Rousillon v. Rousillon 14 the court said that there
existed no rule "that the contract shall be limited as to space
over and above the rule that the contract shall be reasonable;"
and the matter was finally set at rest by the House of Lords in
Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt, etc. Co.,1r where the defendant,
who sold to the plaintiff his business of manufacturing guns and
ammunition for war purposes, and covenanted not to engage in
the business directly or indirectly for twenty-five years, was en-
joined from breach of the covenant though it was world wide in
extent, since the business was of such wide dimensions as to
require a restraint unlimited in space."'
In the United States the cases upholding contracts not to
compete are legion when the restraint is partial and' not unreason-
able ;17 but the struggle to break away from the distinction be-
"See also Hinde v. Gray, i M. & G. 194 (1840).
1'4 Ch. D. 351 (88o).
[1894] A. C. 535.
'More recent English cases- in accord are Goldsoll v. Goldman, [1914] 2
Ch. 6o3; Herbert Morris Co. v. Saxalby, [igi6] A. C. 688, 701.
" Besides the cases cited in notes 27, 28, 32, 33, 35, 36 and 37 infra, see
also United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., infra note 39; American
Brake Beam Co. v. Pungs, 141 Fed. 923 (C. C. A. 7th, i9o5) ; McCurry v.
Gibson, io8 Ala. 451, 18 So. 8o6 (1895); Swigert & Howard v. Tilden, 121
Iowa 65o, 97o N. W. 82 (igo3); Heinz v. Roberts, 135 Iowa 748, iio N. W
io34 (i9o7); Kochenrath v. Christman, i8o Ky. 799, 203 S. W. 738 (i918);
New York Bank Note Co. v. Kidder Press Mfg. Co., 192 Mass. 403, 78 N. E.
463 (i9o6) ; Old Comer Book Store, Inc. v. Upham, 194 Mass. 1o5, 8o N. E.
228 (i9o7); National Ben Co. v. Union Hospital Co., 45 Minn. 272, 47 N. W.
8o6 (1891); Kronschnabel-Smith Co. v. Kronschnabel, 87 Minn. 230, gi N. W.
892 (i9o2); Williams v. Thomson, 143 Minn. 454, 174 N. W. 307 (1927);
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tween particular or partial and general restraints still persists.
There are a number of cases holding contracts by a seller of a
business not to engage in a similar business throughout the entire
state to be invalid because they are in general restraint of trade.'
8
Thus in Taylor v. Blanchard 19 the plaintiff and defendant carried
on a partnership, during which the defendant became acquainted
with the business and its customers. They dissolved partnership,
the defendant selling out to the plaintiff and agreeing not to carry
on in any place in Massachusetts the business of manufacturing
and selling shoe cutters, which was the business the partnership
had conducted. The plaintiff contended that the restraint ought
not to be held bad, saying, "A monopoly extending throughout the
state may be as really injurious to the people of the state as if it
extended throughout the country." 20 In Union Strawboard Co.
v. Bonfield,21 where a seller of a manufacturing business cove-
nanted not to engage in that business for a period of twenty-five
years in the state of Illinois when so doing might conflict with the
business interests or lessen the profits of the buyer, the court held
the covenant bad, saying, "The restrictions imposed by this con-
tract are probably no greater than necessary to prevent competi-
Wills v. Forester, 140 Mo. App. 321, 124 S. W. 1090 (igio); Kramer v. Old,
119 N. C. 1, 25 S. E. 813 (1897) ; Faust v. Rohr, 166 N. C. 187, 8i S. E. io96
(914) ; Bradshaw v. Milliken, i73 N. C. 432, 92 S. E i6i (I917) ; Mar-hof
Co., Inc. v. Rosenbacher, infra 'note 52; Melick v. Foster, 64 N. J. L. 394, 45
Ati. gix (i9oo) ; Nachamkis v. Goldsmith et al., ioi N. J. L. 356, 128 AtI. 238
(1925) ; Marvel v. Jonah, 83 N. J. Eq. 295, 90 Atl. Ioo4, (914), see note in
L. R. A. 1915B 2o6; Underwood v. Smith, ig N. Y. Supp. 38o (1892); Niles
v. Fenm, 12 Misc. 470, 33 N. Y. Supp. 857 (i895) ; Brett v. Ebel, 29 App. Div.
256, 5i N. Y. Supp. 573 (1898) ; Ru Ton v. Everitt, 35 App. Div. 412, 54 N. Y.
Supp. 896 (1898) ; Blauner v. Williams Co., infra. note 52; Excelsior Quilting
Co. v. Creter, 36 Misc. 698, 74 N. Y. Supp. 361 (i9o2) ; American Ice Co. v.
Meckel, iog App. Div. 93, 95 N. Y. Supp. io6o (i9o5) ; Broadbrooks v. Tolles,
114 App. Div. 646, 99 N. Y. Supp. 996 (i9o6); James Van Dyk Co. v. F. V.
Reilly Co., 73 Misc. 87, 130 N. Y. Supp. 755 (igii); Komow v. Simplex Cloth-
Cutting Machine Co., Inc., io9 Misc. 358, I79 N. Y. Supp. 682 (1919) ; Pitts-
burgh Stove & Range Co. v. Penn. Stove Co., 208 Pa. 41, 57 AtI. 77 (904) ;
Boggs v. Friend, 77 W. Va. 531, 87 S. E. 872 (igi6); My Laundry Co. v.
Schmeling, 129 Wis. 527, 109 N. W. 540 (i9o6); Kradwell v. Thiesen, 131
Wis. 97, i1 N. W. 233 (i9o7); Lazar v. Berg, 179 Wis. 6io, igi N. W. 966
(1923).
Harding v. Glucose Co., 182 Ill. 55i, 55 N. E. 577, 64 L. R. A. 738
(1899) ; Lanzit v. Sefton Mfg. Co., 184 Ill. 326, 56 N. E. 393 (i9oo).
19 3 Allen 370 (Mass. i866).
'See also Bishop v. Palmer, 146 Mass. 464, i6 N. E. 299 (1888) ; Hand-
forth v. Jackson, i5o Mass. 149, 22 N. E. 634 (1889).
A 1 93 Ill. 421, 61 N. E. io38 (igoi).
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tion with the Union Strawboard Company in its business, but that
is not the only test of its validity. If it should be conceded that
the contract is divisible, the question then is, under this declara-
tion, whether it can be enforced as to the entire state of Illinois.
Counsel contend that it is valid to that extent, at least, and that
the rule stated on that subject in the cases above cited should not be
adhered to. The reason for the rule is that it is against the policy
of the state that the people of the whole state should be deprived
of the industry and skill of a party in an employment useful to the
public, and he should be compelled either to engage in other busi-
ness or abandon his citizenship of the state and remove elsewhere
in order to support himself and family. The argument is that a
contract, to be in general restraint of trade, must extend to the
entire realm of the United States, which would not be deprived of
the industry of the citizen or of his citizenship unless he were
compelled to go to a foreign country. Within its own sphere the
state has a public policy as a commonwealth, which the courts of
the state regard and enforce, distinct from questions of policy
affecting the nation at large. The state regulates its internal
affairs, supports those who become public charges, and is inter-
ested in the industries of its citizens. It is against the policy of
the state that its citizens should not have the privilege of pursuing
their lawful occupations at some place within its borders, and that
a citizen should be compelled to leave the state to engage in his
business and to support himself and family. It is true that a con-
tract may be valid which embraces portions of more than one
state. Trade and business are not affected by state lines, and a
contract might be good in restraint of trade which embraced
within reasonable limits, parts of different states, but an agree-
ment which applies to the whole state is void, and cannot be
enforced.
22
In California by code provision 28 a contract restraining
Supra note 18.
SCAL. Civ. CoDE: (Deering, 1923) §§ 1673, 1674, 1675:
"Contract in restraint of trade, void. Every contract by which any
one is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business of
any kind, otherwise than is provided by the next two sections, is to that
extent void."
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trade throughout the entire state is invalid. These statutory pro-
visions have been copied in North Dakota,24 South Dakota,25 and
Oklahoma.26  In Massachusetts the later decisions have rejected
the rule that a contract restraining trade throughout the state is
invalid, and there are dicta to the effect that a covenant unlimited
both as to space and time may be valid.27  In the New York case
of Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber,2 8 it was held that a covenant
was not general which did not cover the whole of the United
States.20  Many states expressly reject the state limit ;30 and
Illinois is the only state except those having a statute to the con-
trary where an extension of restraint throughout the entire state
in itself makes the contract bad.
There are many cases wfiere covenants imposing restraints
through6ut the whole of the United States have been treated as
void 3 1 because they constitute a general restraint of trade. But
"Exception in favor of sale of good-will. One who sells the good-will
of a business may agree with the buyer to refrain from carrying on a simi-
lar business within a specified county, city, or a part thereof, so long as
the buyer, or any person deriving title to the good-will from him, carries
on a like business therein."
"Exception in favor of partnership arrangements. Partners may, upon
or in anticipation of a dissolution of the partnership, agree that none of
them will carry on a similar business within the same city or town where
the partnership business has been transacted, or within a specified part
thereof:'
Cavasso v. Downey, 45 Cal. App. 78o, 188 Pac. 594 (Ig2o); Chamber-
lain v. Augustine, I72 Cal. 285, I56 Pac. 479 (igi6) ; Davis v. Jointless Fire
Brick Co., 300 Fed. i (C. C. A. 9th, I924).
2'N. D. Comp. LAWS ANN. (1913) §§ 5928-5930.
S. D. R v. CODE (igig) §§ 898-goo.
SO=A. REv. LAws (1921) §§ 978-98o.
"Anchor Electric Co. v. Hawks, 171 Mass. 1oI, 5o N. E. 5o9 41 L. R. A.
189 (1898); United Shoe Machinery Co. v. Kimball, 193 Mass. 351, 358, 79
N. E. 790 (Igo7); Marshall Engine Co. v. New Marshall Engine Co., 2o3
Mass. 410, 424, 89 N. E. 548 (19o9).
"io6 N. Y. 473, 13 N. E. 419 (1887).
"Exclusion of Nevada and Montana was held to preclude objection on
ground of covenant being general.
' Newell v. Meyendorff, 9 Mont. 254, 23 Pac. 333, 8 L. R. A. 44o (i89o);
Herreshoff v. Bontmeau, 17 R. 1. 3, ig AtI. 712 (189o).
"All courts which hold the covenant for a restraint covering an entire.
state had, as in notes 20-23 supra, would necessarily treat a more general re-
straint bad. Callahan v. Donneolly, 45 Cal. i52 (1872); Gamewell Fire Alarm
Tel. Co. v. Crane, infra note 40. (this doctrine is repeated in later Massachu-
setts cases, see note 27 supMa) ; Hungerforth v. Jackson, I5O Mass. 149, 22 N. E.
634 (1893) ; Ropes v. Upton, 125 Mass. 258 (1878) ; Boutelle v. Smith, 116
Mass. iii (1874), (but see also Morse Twist Drill Co. v. Morse, IO3 Mass.
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logical adherence to the principle that a restraint is valid if it is no
more extensive than the legitimate interests of the promisee de-
mand, requires a repudiation of the distinction between partial
and general restraints; and many recent decisions in the United
States adopting this test of reasonableness of the restraint seem
to favor the validity of covenants unlimited as to space.3 2
While a failure to limit the restraint as to space will in many
states, even though the restraint is not greater than the protection
which the legitimate interests of the covenantee demands, render
the contract invalid, a similar failure to limit the restraint as to
time will not everywhere invalidate the contract ;33 though in some
73 (i869)) ; Roberts v. Lemont, 73 Nebr. 365, io2 N. W. 770 (1905) (unlimited
in time and space, void); Wyder v. Milhomme, infra note, 75, semble; Maier
v. Homain, 4 Daly i68 (N.Y. 1871); Taylor v. Saurman, IIO Pa. 3, i At. 4o
(1885) (dictum, contracts too unlimited as to space, void). In Caswell v.
Gibbs, 33 Mich. 331 (1875), an agreement never to tow vessels in competition
with the plaintiff was held to be too indefinite and uncertain in character to be
enforcible. See note 13 Am. Rep. 173; and also American Laundry Co. v.
E. W. Dry Cleaning Co., i99 Ala. 154, 74 So. 58 (1917) ; Boone v. Burnham &
Dallas, 291 Ky. 91, 200 S. W. 315 (i918); Hensche v. Moore, 257 Pa. 196, IOZ
AtI. 308 (1917) ; Monongahela River Consolidated Coal and Coke Co. v. Jute
2io Pa. 288, 59 Atl. I88, 2 Ann. Cas. 957 (i9o4) ; see Everett v. Boone, 15i Ga.
311, 121 S. E. 240 (924).
Prame v. Ferrell, i66 Fed. 702 (C. C. A. 6th, i9og) ; Knapp v. S. Jarvis
Adams Co., 135 Fed. ioo8 (C. C. A. 6th, i9o5) ; Carter v. Alling, 43 Fed. 2O8
(C. C. N. D. IlL, i89o); Cropper v. Davis, 243 Fed. 310 (C. C. A. 8th., 1917);
United States Chemical Co. v. Provident Chemical Co., 64 Fed. 946 (C. C. E.
D. Mo., 1894); Nat. Enameling & Stamping Co. v. Haberman, 12o Fed. 415
(C. C. Conn., 1903); Hall Mfg. Co. v. Western Steel & Iron Works, infra
note 84 (unlimited either in space or time) ; Barrows v. McMurtry Mfg. Co.,
54 Colo. 432, 131 Pac. 430 (9Q13) ; Swigert v. Tilden, 121 Iowa 65o, 97 N. W.
82, 63 L. R. A. 6o8 (1903) ; Anchor Electric Co. v. Hawkes, Marshall Engine
Co. v. New Marshall Engine Co., both supra note 27; Western Woodenware
Asso. v. Starkey, infra note 71; Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, supra note 28;
Leslie v. Lorrilard, no N. Y. 519, i8 N. E. 363 (1888); Good v. Daland, 121
N. Y. I, 24 N. E. 15 (189o).
"Smith v. Webb, 176 Ala. 596, 58 So. 913 (1912); American Laundry
Co. v. E. & W. Dry Cleaning Co., 199 Ala. 154, 74 So. 58 (917) ; McCurry v.
Gibson, io8 Ala. 451, i8 So. 8o6 (1895) ; Webster v. Williams, 62 Ark. 101, 34
S. W. 537 (1896); Styles v. Lyon, 87 Conn. 23, 86 Atl. 564 (1913) ; McAuliffe
v. Vaughan, 135 Ga. 852, 70 S. E. 322 (1911) ; Eisel v. Hayes, 141 Ind. 41, 40
N. E. iig (1895) ; O'Neil v. Hines, 145 Ind. 32, 43 N. E. 946 (z897) ; Hamilton
v. Ryan, 1o3 Ill. App. 212, rezld., 2o5 Ill. 191, 68 N. E. 781 (i9o3); Arnold v.
Kreutzer, 67 Iowa 2r4, 25 N. W. 138 (1885) ; Mooreman v. Parkerson, 131
La. 204, 59 So. 122, 123 (1912) ; United States Shoe Machinery Co. v. Kimball,
193 Mass. 351, 79 N. E. 790 (igo7) ; Foss v. Roby, 19s Mass. 292, 81 N. E. 9.9
(1o97); Up River Ice Co. v. Denler, 114 Mich. 296, 72 N. W. 157 (0897) ;
Holliston v. Ernaton, 124 Minn. 49, 144 N. W. 415 (1913); Gill v. Ferris, 82
Mo. i56 (1884); Kramer v. Old, ii N. C. 1, 25 S. E. 813 (1896); Dow v.
Gotch, 113 Neb. 6o, 2oI N. W. 655 (i924) ; CarlI v. Snyder, 26 At. 977 (N. J.
1893) ; Scherman v. Stern, 117 Atl. 631 (N. J. 1922) ; Boyden v. Baldwin, 15
Misc. Rep. 103, 36 N. Y. Supp. 478 (I895) ; Lappano v. Marmone, i98 N. Y.
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states where restraint as to time is unlimited or more extensive
than required for proper protection of the covenantee, the con-
tract is rendered bad.3 4 In other states covenants which are
unlimited are construed as meaning a reasonable time,85 or for the
life of the promisee,381 or so long as the promisee continues in
business.
37
(c) Reasonableness. The distinction between general and
partial restraints is an artificial and technical one, for the real
objections to contracts -not to compete are: (i) that they divest
the promisor of his means of earning a livelihood and supporting
himself and family; and (2) that they deprive the community of
(a) the benefit of his services and (b) the benefit which his com-
petition might offer. It is obvious that it cannot be true that
there is no force to these objections so long as the restraint is
partial, but that objections suddenly arise just at the point when
the restraint becomes universal. The truth is, the force of these
objections increases gradually as the restraint increases in space
and time, and diminishes in the same manner as the restraints
decrease in space and time. If the promisor is precluded by his
contract from carrying on his trade everywhere, any time in the
future, these objections have their fullest force; and if the re-
straint is only for a small territory and for a short time none of
these objections have much weight. It is not the mere fact of
the universality of the restraint, but the burdensomeness of the
restraint as it becomes more extensive, that gives force to these
Supp. 433 (I923) ; Stewart v. Biddele, 79 Pa. 336 (1875); Henschke v. Moore,
infra note 34; French v. Parker, i6 R. I. 219, 14 Atl. 870 (1888) ; Tillinghast
v. Boothby, 2o R. I. 59, 37 Ati. 344 (z897) ; Turner v. Abbott, 1I6 Tenn. 718,
94 S. W. 64 (9o6) ; Rudolph v. Graham, 254 S. W. 402 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
"Rakestraw v. Lanier, IO5 Ga. 488, 3o S. E. 735 (x898) ; Tarr v. Stear-
man, 264 Ill. zio, 7o5 N. E. 957 (1914) ; Ford v. Gregson, 7 Mont. 89, I4 Pac.
659 (887); Mandeville v. Harman, 42 N. J. Eq. 185, 7 At. 37 (1886);
Henschke v. Moore, 257 Pa. 196, ioi Atl. 2o8 (91) ; Carroll v. Giles, 30 S. C.
412, 9 S. E. 422 (1889) ; Tecktonius v. Scott, Ino Wis. 441, 86 N. W. 672 (igoi).
'Raclamann v. Riverbank Imp. Co., 167 Mass. 1, 44 N. E. 99o (1896);
Boggs v. Friend, 77 W. Va. 53, 87 S. E. 873 (I916).
" Saddlery, etc., Co. v. Hillsborough Mills, 68 N. H. 216, 44 Atl. 300
(I895); Hauser v. Harding, 126 N. C. 295, 35 S. E. 586 (I900) ; see also
Wooten v. Harris, 153 N. C. 43, 68 S. E. 898 (igio).
'Tarry v. Johnson, 114 Neb. 496, 2o8 N. W. 615 (1926) ; Weickgenant v.
Eccles, 173 Mich. 65s, 740 N. W. 513 (1913).
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objections. However, they have enough force that no matter
how restricted the restraint is in space and time, a bare contract
not to compete is invalid; 38 and in order that a contract not to
compete may be sustained under the principle that it is a reason-
able restraint, it must be "ancillary to the main purpose of a law-
ful contract and necessary to protect the covenantee in the enjoy-
ment of the legitimate fruits of the contract, or to protect him
from the dangers of an unjust use of those fruits by another
party." 9
In other words, it is apparent that the problem of determin-
ing the validity of contracts not to compete under the rule of
reasonableness is a problem of balancing social interests, of set-
ting over against the social detriment involved in restricting the
promisor's activities the social advantages of protecting the prom-
isee in legitimate interests which the contract gives him, and of
enabling the covenantor advantageously to dispose of his business
or services. The objections to restraint of trade, namely, that it
divests the promisor of his means of earning a livelihood and of
supporting himself and family, and that it deprives the community
of the benefit of his services and the benefit which his competition
might offer, are offset by the more important social interest in-
volved in making goodwill of a business or other property vend-
ible, or in protecting the covenantee in some proper interest cov-
ered by the contract.4"
'Shepard v. Lesser, 127 Ark. 590, 193 S. W. 262 (1917) ; Clemens v.
Meadows, 23 Ky. 178, 94 S. W. 13 (i9o6) ; Oliver v. Gilmore, 52 Fed. 562 (C.
C. Mass., 1892) ; Cravens v. Carter Crune Co., 92 Fed. 479 (C. C. A. 6th, I899) ;
Cleaver v. Lenhart, 182 Pa. 290, 37 AUt. 811 (1897) (a contract not to compete
made by the seller after the sale was completed, held invalid); Mitchell v.
Reynolds, supra note 9.
Taft, J., in United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 85 Fed, 271,
288 (C. C. A. 6th, 1898).
"This question is interestingly presented by Gamewell Fire Alarm Tel.
Co. v. Crane, 16o Mass. 50, 35 N. E. 98, 22 L. R. A. 673 (1893). Crane, who
had manufactured fire-alarm and police telegraph apparatus for twelve years
for the plaintiff, and who had no other customer, sold out his business to the
plaintiff and agreed not to engage in the business of manufacturing or selling
fire alarm or police telegraph apparatus, and not to enter into competition with
the plaintiff for ten years. Crane sold no goodwill to the defendant and was not
therefore, by entering into a competing business, encroaching upon any good-
will he had sold to the plaintiff; and the court felt that the stipulation was:
"something more than is reasonably necessary to protect the plaintiff in the
enjoyment of the property it bought." If goodwill were all the plaintiff bought
this reasoning of the court would be unobjectionable. But there was property
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If the contract imposes a burden upon the promisor out of all
relation to the benefit to the promisee, it will be held to be unrea-
sonable.41  The degree of restraint which should be decreed to
be reasonable should vary with the interest of the covenantee
which it seeks to protect. In the sale of a business the interest
of the covenantee which is sought to be protected is very different
from the interests of the employer covenantee in a covenant not to
compete after a term of employment. In the former case the
social interest sought to be protected is making the goodwill of a
business which a man has built up, and which is valuable, a legiti-
mate and vendible asset. To hold invalid the contract of the vendor
not to compete, where unrestrained competition will effectively
diminish the value of the goodwill sold, would prevent goodwill
from b;eing adequately transferred. The balance of social interest
favors allowing a man freedom to restrain himself from carrying
on a particular business in order that he may be able to sell a val-
uable business asset which he has developed. The extent to which
the seller may restrain himself from carrying on the trade or busi-
ness will depend on how far such restraint is necessary to prevent
interference with the goodwill sold. Whether the restraint may
be general or universal in extent should depend on whether the
goodwill of the business sold requires an unlimited restraint for
its reasonable protection. The mere fact that the covenant is
unlimited in time and space ought never to make it void, and the
cases which hold covenants void on that ground alone have no
sufficient reason to support them.
In the case of a covenant not to engage in competing trade
after the termination of an employment, the interest of the cov-
enantee which is sought to be protected is the interest which
society has that professional and business men be protected in
employing efficient assistants. To protect this interest is for the
benefit of not only employers but of employees as well, enabling
the latter to dispose of their services advantageously. In order
sold, and it was a type of property that might not be vendible to any great ex-
tent unless the vendor was able to preclude himself from entering into the same
business or competing with the buyer; and this covenant might very well have
been found to be ancillary to an interest purchased by the buyer, the failure to
enfQrce which would impair the interest bought.
'See infra notes 75 and 94.
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that this interest may be protected, employees should be able to
legally bind themselves not to use the personal knowledge of trade
secrets and the personal influence with customers of the employer
which the employee gains in the employment. There is no basis,
however, for holding that the contract not to compete should be
treated as valid when the restraint extends beyond the use of such
knowledge and influence. Cases assuming that covenants which
do not go beyond giving the protection which the employer's busi-
ness requires are valid 42 go too far, as the employer's business
may require restraints which he is not entitled to impose.
Covenants in restraint of trade may include covenants not to
compete which are ancillary (i) to the sale or lease of a business,
(2) to the sale or lease of property, (3) to a contract of partner-
ship or retirement from a partnership, and (4) to contracts of a
servant or agent entering employment. Mr. Justice Taft, then
Circuit Judge, in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.
43
summarized such of these contracts as might be upheld as follows:
"Covenants in partial restraint of trade are generally
upheld as valid when they are agreements (i) by the seller
of property or business not to compete with the buyer in such
a way as to derogate from the value of the property or busi-
ness sold; (2) by a retiring partner not to compete with the
firm; (3) by a partner pending the partnership not to do
anything to interfere, by competition or otherwise, with the
business of the firm; (4) by the buyer of property not to use
the same in competition with the business retained by the
seller; and (5) by an assistant, servant, or agent not to com-
pete with his master or employer after the expiration of his
time of service. Before such agreements are upheld, how-
ever, the court must find that the restraints attempted thereby
are reasonably necessary (I, 2, and 3) to the enjoyment by
the buyer of the property, goodwill, or interest in the part-
nership bought; or (4) to the legitimate ends of the existing
partnership; or (5) to the prevention of possible injury to
the business of the seller from use by the buyer of the thing
sold; or (6) to the protection from the danger of loss to the
employer's business caused by the unjust use on the part of
the employee of the confidential knowledge acquired in such
business."
"Herbert Morris v. Saxelby, [1916] A. C. 688.
"Supra note 39.
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CONTRACTS NOT TO COMPETE ON THE SALE OF A BUSINESS
(a) How far the sale of a goodwill without a covenant not
to compete restricts competition. The sale of a business carries
with it the goodwill of the business, although not expressly men-
tioned ;44 and a sale of the goodwill, whether expressly mentioned
or implied, on the sale of the business generally precludes the
seller from soliciting the former customers of the business sold.
It was once held in England 43 that the vendor of a business (part-
nership in the particular instance) might not only compete with
the buyer but might solicit trade from customers of the old firm;
but the House of Lords in 1895 in Trego v. Hunt 4 overruled the
earlier case, and Trego v. Hunt has been followed in England 47
and in most of the American states, with the result that the law
now generally is that the seller of a business, although he has
made no covenant of any kind, may. not solicit the former cus-
tomers of the business. 48 In a few states, however, the sale of a
business does not preclude the seller from soliciting the customers
In Louisiana goodwill must be expressly included. Menendez v. Holt, 128
U. S. 514 (1888). See also note in 1917 Ann. Cas. 1015, 5 L. R. A.-(Nr. s.) io77,
x6 L. R. A. (N. s.) 240.
Smith v. Webb, 176 Ala. 596, 58 So. 913 (1912); Didlake v. Roden
Grocery Co., i6o Ala. 484, 49 So. 384 (1909) ; Shafer v. Sloan, 3 Cal. App.
335, 85 Pac. I62 (igo6) ; Acme Harvester Co. v. Craver, 209 Ill. 483, 70 N. E.
1047 (1904); Bennett v. Carmichael Produce Co., 64 Ind. App. 341, 115 N. E.
793 (1917) ; Wilmer v. Thomas, 74 Md. 485, 22 Atl. 403 (189x) ; Fairfield v.
Lowery, 207 Mass. 352, 93 N. E. 598 (i91i) ; Hoxie v. Chaney, 143 Mass. 592,
1o N. E. 713 (1887) ; William v. Farraid, 88 Mich. 473, 5o N. W. 446 (1891) ;
Johnson v. Bruzek, 142 Minn. 454, 172 N. W. 700 (I919) ; Merry v. Hoopes,
iii N. Y. 415, 18 N. E. 714 (1888); Hegeman v. Hegeman, 8 Daly I (N. Y.
i88o); Little v. Fleischman, i77.N. C. 21, 98 S. E. 455 (919).
"Pearson v. Pearson, 27 Ch. D. 145 (1884).
[8961 A. C. 7.
"Jennings v. Jennings, [1898]1 Ch. 378; Gillingham v. Beddow, [igoo]
2 Ch. 242; Carl v. Webster, [9o4] i Ch. 685.
"In England, see supra notes 46 and 47; in the United States, Ranit v.
Reimers, 200 Ill. 386, 65 N. E. 720 (192) ; Drake v. Dodsworth, 4 Kan. 159(1867); Fairfield v. Lowry, 217 Mass. 352, 3 N. E. 598 (i911); Brown v.
Benzinger, 118 Md. :29, 84 Ad.- 79 (igia) ; Finch v. Michael, x67 N. C. 233, 83
S. E. 458 (1914) ; Faust v. Rohr, 166 N. C. 187, 81 S. E. i096 (1914) ; Auto
Hearse Mfg. Co. v. Bateman, i09 Adl. 735 (N. J. igao); Hilton v. Hilton,
89 N. J. Eq. 182, 104 At. 375 (I918) ; Snyder Pasteurized Milk Co. v. Burton,
85 N. J. Eq., 185, 83 At. 9o7 (1912) ; Von Bremen v. MacMonnies, 20o N. Y.
41, 93 N. E. x86 (igio) ; Wentzel v. Barbin, 189 Pa. 5o2, 42 At. 44 (I8g) ;
Ferris v. Pett, 42 R. I. 48, io5 Aft. 369 (1919) ; Zanturjian v. Boornazian, 25
R. 1151, 55 At. igg (i9o3) ; Sheehan v. Sheehan-Hackley, i96 S. W. 665 (Tex.
Civ: App., 1917).
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of the old business, where there is no agreement not to compete.49
"But the sale of a business does not preclude the vendor who has
not covenanted not to compete from setting up a rival and com-
peting business, if he does not solicit the old customers. 50 Massa-
chusetts is an exception, it being held there that a sale of the good-
will of the business even without a covenant not to compete may
in some cases preclude the setting up of a competing business.51
(b) How far competition may be restricted by a covenant
not to compete. The covenant in restraint of trade accompany-
ing the sale of property or business may be made either by the
buyer or seller. The seller may agree not to set up in competition
with the buyer, or the buyer may agree not to use the property or
the business purchased in competition with property or business
retained by the seller. The same rules for determining the reason-
ableness or the validity of the covenant should apply whether the
covenant is made by the seller or the buyer.
A contract not to compete which is not ancillary to the sale
'*Cottrell v. Babcock Printing Press Mfg. Co., 54 Conn. 122, 6 At. 791
(1886) ; Williams v. Farrand, 88 Mich. 473, 50 N. W. 446 (i89i) ; Fish Bros.
Wagon Co. v. LaBelle Wagon Works, 82 Wis. 546, 52 N. W. 595, I6 L. R. A.
453 (I892). An agreement not to compete may be implied; see Lazan v. Berg,
179 Wis. 6io, igi N. W. 966 (1923).
Didlake v. Roden Grocery Co., supra note 44; Howard v. Taylor, 90 Ala.
247, 8 So. 36 (189o) ; Cottrell v. Babcock Printing Press Mfg. Co., supra note
49; Porter v. Gorman, 65 Ga. II (879) ; Ranft v. Reimers, supra note 48;
Beatty v. Coble, 142 Ind. 329, 41 N. E. 590 (I895) ; Dare v. Foy, i8o Iowa, 1i56,
164 N. W. 179 (917) ; Drake v. Dodsworth, 4 Kan. i59 (1867) ; Bergamni v.
Bastian, 35 La. Ann. 6o (1883) ; Hutchinson v. Nay, 187 Mass. 262, 72 N. E.
974 (I9o4) ; Williams v. Farrand, 88 Mich. 473, 50 N. W. 446 (189i) ; Counts
v. Medley, 163 Mo. App. 546, 146 §. W. 465 (1912); Wessel v. Havens, gi Neb.
426, 136 N. W. 7o (I912) ; Faust v. Rohr, 166 N. C. 187, 8i S. E io96 (914) ;
Morehead Sea Food Co. v. Way, i6g N. C. 679, 86 S. E. 603 (i915) ; Scudder
v. Kilfoil, 57 N. J. Eq. 171, 4o Atl. 6o2 (1898); Althen v. Vreeland, 36 At.
479 (N. J. 1897); Von Bremen v. MacMonnies, 2oo N. Y. 41, 93 N. E. i86
mod. 138 App. Div. 319, 122 N. Y. Supp. IO87 (igio); Brass, etc., Works v.
Payne, 5o Ohio St. 1I5, 33 N. E. 88, (1893) ; see Neutzel v. Barbin, i8g Pa.
5o2, 42 Atl. 44 (1899) ; White v. Trowbridge, 216 Pa. ii, 64 At. 862 (igo6) ;
Zanturjian v. Boornazian, 25 R. I. I5i, 55 Atl. igg (igo3); Fine v. Lawless,
139 Tenn. i6o, 201 S. W. i6o (i918) ; Sheehan v. Sheehan-Hackley, 196 S. W.
665 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
'Angier v. Webber, 14 Allen 211 (Mass. 1867) ; Foss v. Roby, 195 Mass.
292, 81 N. E. igg (i9o7); Old Corner Book Store v. Upham, 194 Mass. IOI,
8o N. E. 28 (i9o7) ; Gordin v. Knott, igg Mass. 173, 85 N. E. 417 (i9o8) ;
Bachelder v. Bachelder, 220 Mass. 43, 107 N. E. 455 (0914). See Webster v.
Webster, 18o 'Mass. 316, 62 N. E. 383 (1903), where the sale was of goods
and chattels, and no goodwill was sold. Also Hoxie v. Chaney, 143 Mass. 592,
io N. E. 713 (1887).
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of a business or some lawful contract is not valid.52 Thus it was
held in Tuscaloosa Ice Mfg. Co. v. Williams,53 where the plaintiff
and defendant each owned and operated the only ice plants in a
small city, and the plaintiff agreed for a consideration not to run
his ice plant for five years, that the contract was invalid. In
Arctic Ice Co. v. Franklin Ice Co.54 an agreement by one ice com-
pany to sell all its output to a second, which should discontinue
manufacturing ice and only sell the ice of the first company, was
also held invalid. In Clemons v. Meadows 55 the New Meadows
Hotel agreed to close up and remain closed for three years in
consideration of the Usona Hotel, a competing hotel in a city of
500o inhabitants, paying the Meadows Hotel $ioo.oo per month.
The court held this contract was invalid, as it was not a restraint
imposed to protect a business sold, but merely a means used to
eliminate a competitor. And in Oliverv. Cilmore,5  where Oliver
Bros. agreed with eight corporations to close their works for a
period of five years in consideration of the corporations paying
them a monthly sum of money equal to 3Y2 per cent. of their sales,
the court held the contract invalid as in unreasonable restraint of
trade, it not being ancillary to the sale of a business.
The restraint, to be reasonable, must not be larger than is
required for the necessary protection of the promisee. In Oregon
Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor,57 the California Navigation Co.
sold the steamer, New World, to the plaintiff, the latter agreeing
not to use the steamer in the waters of California for ten years.
The plaintiff sold the steamer to the defendant Winsor in 1864
with a stipulation that the defendant would not run the vessel in
the waters of California or on the Columbia River for io years
from 1867. The covenant was broader than was necessary to
'Mitchel v. Reynolds, supra note 9; United States v. Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co., supra note 39. The covenant may protect the buyer in the use of a
particular piece of property purchased: Mar Hof Co., Inc. v. Rosenbacher, I76
N. C. 330, 97 S. E. 169 (I918) ; New York Bank Note Mfg. Co. v. Kidder Press
Mfg. Co., i92 Mass. 403, 78 N. E. 463 (i9o6) ; Blauner v. Williams Co., 36 Misc.
173, 73 N. Y. Supp 165 (igoi).
3 127 Ala. NO, 28 So. 669 (igoo).
" I45 Ky. 32, 139 S. W. 1080 (19ii).
"123 Ky. 178, 94 S. W. 13 (i9o6).
.'52 Fed. 562 (C. C. Mass., 1892).
520 Wall. 64 (U: S., 1873).
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protect the plaintiff as respects the use of the waters of California,
as he was only entitled to a protection for IO years from 1864;
and the court held the contract valid for i o years as to the Colum-
bia River and for seven years as to California. In Hodge v.
Sloan 8 the plaintiff conveyed land to John D. Sloan and Sloan
in turn to the defendant. Sloan covenanted not to sell any sand
off the land, and the defendant had notice of this covenant. The
plaintiff had a well-established business selling sand and the ven-
dee did not want the land for that purpose. The plaintiff had
declined to sell the land for fear such sale would injure his busi-
ness and deprive him of his living, but was willing to make the
sale upon the purchaser making a covenant not to sell sand off the
land purchased. The court held that this covenant was valid and
binding upon the defendant. It is interesting to compare this
case with Brewer v. Marshall and Cheeseman,59 where the vendor
covenanted not to sell any marl off the premises adjoining the
premises conveyed, and the defendant was a purchaser from the
vendor with notice of the covenant. The court held'the covenant
was invalid as an unreasonable restraint of trade in that it im-
posed a greater restriction than necessary for the protection of
the vendee. In both of these cases, the restraint was general as
to time, place and person, and if the restriction was placed upon
the power of the vendor to sell in order to protect the purchaser in
selling marl from land which he bought for that purpose, there
would seem to be no ground for distinguishing the cases. The
restraint in each case is no more general than is reasonably re-
quired to protect the covenantee in the property retained or con-
veyed. In Henschke v. Moore,60 plaintiffs granted to defendants
the exclusive right to manufacture and use a patented apparatus
for feeding horse-hair from a bundle to a wrapping device, the
contract containing a provision for surrender or cancellation of
the license, and that in case of such surrender or cancellation the
defendant would not, either directly or indirectly, engage in the
business of manufacturing or selling horse-hair yarn similar to
Ia iO7 N. Y. 244, 17 N. E. 335 (1887).
"Ig N. J. Eq. 537 (i868).
60257 Pa. im, IOx At. 308 (1917).
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the product of the machine. The court held that while the plain-
tiff was entitled to require a covenant for a proper protection of
his use of the machine, this restraint was unreasonable and not
legitimate, as going beyond what was needed to protect the plain-
tiff. It said: "There was nothing to justify them in seeking to
restrain defendants from engaging in the business of manufactur-
ing hair yarn by the use of any machine which did not infringe
their patent."
The case of Wittenberg v. Mollyneaux0 ' involves an interest-
ing application of the principle that covenants not to carry on
business or not to compete are valid where merely ancillary to
the sale of property, business, or a term of employment. In this
case the plaintiff owned an hotel in Sutton which he agreed to
exchange for the defendant's hotel. The deed to the defendant
provided that the premises therein described should not be used
for hotel purposes for two years. This stipulation was violated
and stit brought upon the covenant, and it is alleged in the defense
that the. stipulation is invalid, as a restraint of trade tending to a
monopoly, there being but two hotels in Sutton. The court held
the covenant valid, saying that although such agreements tend to
suppress competition and to make for monopolies, they are valid
and in harmony with the policy of the state (to promote com-
merce by facilitating the transfer of property) if they were made
for such purpose; but that if the main purpose of the transaction
was to secure a monopoly, and the transfer of the property was
merely an incident or a means to that end, it was bad as a restraint
on trade. The fact that the hotel which the covenantee obtained
was not and had not been running for some time whereas the hotel
which he transferred had been operating, makes the situation one
in which the covenantee is merely requiring the covenantor, who
has sold him an hotel and an hotel business, not to set up an hotel
business in competition with him. The covenantee has purchased
an hotel and a business, the protection of which requires this cov-
enant on the part of the seller.
Not infrequently it is difficult to discover whether the agree-
ment not to compete is the main thing, to which the sale of a busi-
6o Neb. 583, 83 N. W. 842 (igoo).
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ness is ancillary, or whether the agreement not to compete is ancil-
lary to a bona fide sale. The fact that the agreement contains
nothing more than a covenant not to compete does not necessarily
mean that the covenant is not ancillary to a sale. In Cincinnati,
Portsmouth, Big Sandy & Pomeroy Packet Co. v. Bay,6 2 where
the plaintiff sold to the defendant some steamers, barges, coal
flats, and stock, and agreed not to engage in the freight and pas-
senger packet business, it was contended by the defendant that
the contract was illegal as an illegal restraint upon trade, the con-
tract not to carry on the business not being ancillary to the sale of
a business, for there was no business sold. To this contention
Mr. Justice Holmes replied: "It is said there is no sale of good-
will. But the covenant makes the sale. Presumably all that there
was to sell, besides certain instruments of competition, was the
competition itself, and the purchasers did not want the vendors'
names." In National Benefit Co. v. Union Hospital Co.6 3 the
plaintiff agreed with the defendant not to sell insurance in Minne-
sota, Wisconsin and the northern peninsula of Michigan (with
certain exceptions) for three years, the defendant agreeing to pay
plaintiff a stipulated sum for refraining from engaging in the
business. The court held this contract constituted a sale of the
plaintiff's business and goodwill, and was valid. In Wickins v.
Evans 64 three persons engaged in manufacturing and selling
boxes and trunks in England and Wales entered into a contract to
divide the country into three parts, each taking a part to the exclu-
sion of the others. The court held this contract valid.
If there is no goodwill yet developed in a business, as in
Gamewell Fire Alarm Co. v. Crane,65 where the seller had manu-
factured police telegraph apparatus exclusively for the buyer for
twelve years, a covenant by the seller on making a sale of the
business to the buyer not to compete would not be ancillary to or
protect a goodwill sold, and it would therefore be invalid. Some-
times courts have failed to observe this restriction, that a contract
not to compete, to be valid, must be ancillary to the sale of prop-
6200 U. S. 179 (iqo6).
C45 Minn. 272,47 N. W. 8o6 (I89i).
'3 Younge & J. 318 (1829).
0 Supra note 40.
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erty, business goodwill, or a term of employment. Thus in Leslie
v. Lorillard 66 there was no sale of any tangible property whose
value to the buyers might be impaired without the covenant not
to compete; and there does not seem to have been any substantial
goodwill developed by the seller. The court in its discussion of
the covenant does not seem to think its validity depends upon it
being ancillary to the sale of a business goodwill or any main
transaction. A similar ignoring of this requirement is exhibited
in Kellogg v. Larkin,67 where the mill owners of Milwaukee
agreed to pay to the warehouse men four cents per bushel on
wheat coming into the Milwaukee market, so far as they were
able to control the same; and the warehousemen agreed "not to
purchase, store, or handle any wheat in the Milwaukee market
except under the direction of the defendants from the seventh of
January to the first day of August following." The court held
this covenant valid, as it was not general, and was useful to the
promisees as a protection to them in the prosecution of their busi-
ness. The covenants accompanied leases, but it was obvious that
the covenants were not in any proper sense property leased. The
leases were made simply as a part of the scheme to restrain trade
or reduce competition, and were merely ancillary to such purpose.
In Palumbo v. Piccioni 68 it was held that a proprietor of a
shoe repairing business who had bought out a competitor under
an agreement by the seller not to engage in that business in the
city for five years, could restrain such seller from engaging in the
business within the city within that time even after he had resold
the business purchased. The court reasoned that the contract
could be sustained, as it was for the benefit of the complainant's
other business as well as the business he purchased of the defend-
ant. The court completely failed to grasp the theory upon which
contracts not to compete are upheld. In the case of a contract
not to compete which is ancillary to the sale of a business the
contract is upheld, if at all, upon the principle that the social
interest in not having the promisor divested of his means of earn-
"11o N. Y. 5ig, 18 N. E. 363 (i888).
'3 Pinney 123, 3 Chandler 133 (Wis. 1851).
8.9 N. J. Eq. 40, io3 AUt. 8r5 (1418).
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ing a livelihood and of supporting himself and family, and the
community deprived of the benefit of his competition, are of less
importance than the social interest involved in making a business,
which the seller has built up, advantageously vendible. The cove-
nant not to compete if made exclusively for the benefit of the com-
plainant's other business would certainly not be upheld; and it
seems clear that to permit the complainant to enjoin the seller
after he has parted with the business purchased in order to pro-
tect his other business is unwarranted. If the person who pur-
chased the business of the complainant bought such property un-
derstanding that he was getting it free from the possibility of the
defendant's competition, he could have the defendant restrained o9
because the covenant is incident to the sale of the business, and
the benefit runs with it. But unless the complainant in making
the sale had undertaken to provide against the competition of the
defendant, he has no interest to protect after he has sold the busi-
ness which would warrant the issuance of an injunction at his
behest.
70
Often the covenant not to compete is made to appear as ancil-
lary to a sale of a business when the sale is merely a pretense,
71
as in Clark v. NeedhaM, 72 where the plaintiffs agreed, in consider-
ation of $1500 to be paid annually, to lease their machinery for
five years and not to manufacture or sell chaplets for that period.
The court held this contract invalid, as the lease was a mere pre-
tense, and the covenant not to manufacture or sell was not made
to protect a business bona fide leased or sold. If there is a bona
fide sale of a business, a covenant not to compete in protection of
the business purchased has been held not invalid where no monop-
oly resulted, although the purpose of the transaction was to elimi-
nate the seller as a competitor.
73
Sickles v. Lauman, x85 Iowa 37, 169 N. W. 670 (igi8) ; Hickey v. Brink-
ley, 88 Neb. 356, 129 N. W. 553 (I91ix) ; Scherman v. Stem, 93 N. J. Eq. 626,
117 Atl. 631 (i922); Jochum Bros., Inc., v. Ridgewood Pie Baking Co., 2o6 N.
Y. Supp. 252 (1924).
" See Oregon Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor, supra note 57.
"Western Wooden Ware Ass'n. v. Starkey, 84 Mich. 76, 47 N. W. 604
(i89o).
72 125 Mich. 84, 83 N. W. 1057 (1900).
" United States Chemical Co. v. Provident Chemical Co., supra note 32.
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In the sale of a professional business there may be no tangible
property to transfer, and in such case, where there exists a good-
will to be sold, a covenant not to carry on the practice of the pro-
fession throughout the region to which it had extended would
merely be a means of selling the goodwill.
74
Even a covenant which is ancillary to the sale of a business
will be void unless it is essential to the protection of some legiti-
mate interest acquired by the buyer under the sale. If the re-
straint, no matter how narrow, is broader than is required to
protect the thing purchased, the covenant will be bad.75 But a
covenant no broader than is needed to protect the goodwill of a
business sold is valid 76 except where the restraint is general and
the case arises in one of those jurisdictions which still adhere to
the rule that general restraints are always bad even though they
are reasonable. On principle, barring the question of monopoly,
the covenant not to compete made by the vendor in connection
with the sale of a business may validly extend the restraint over
such-territory and for such length of time as is required to give
the purchaser the full benefit of his purchase, no matter if the
restraint is unlimited in extent both in space and time; but any
restraint beyond such limit is unreasonable and void. This is the
English law 77 and is fast becoming the American law.7 The
exceptions still existing in America are in those jurisdictions
where the restraint if unlimited territorially 79 is treated as bad,
or where the restraint covers the whole of a state 80 or the United
States."1
'There is some conflict in the cases as to whether the seller
may make a covenant not to compete broader than the existing
business sold. Some courts limit the possibility of a valid cove-
"Rowe v. Toon, 185 Iowa 848, I69 N. W. 38 (i9i8).
"Wyder v. Milhomme, 96 N. J. L. 5oo, 115 AtI. 380 (192i).
"McClurg's Appeal, 58 Pa. 5i (x868) ; Rowe v. Toone, 185 Iowa 848, 169
N. W. 38 (1918).
"See cases cited in notes 15, 16 supra.
" See supra notes 28, 29, 32, 33.
"See supra note 31.
See supra notes 18, 23, 24, 25 and 26.
See supra note 31.
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nant to the extent of the existing business. s2 Others would allow
the covenant to cover territory wherever "by reasonable attention
the trade could be expected to extend." s3 Thus in Hall Mfg. Co.
v. Western Steel & Iron Works,s4 where the existing business
extended over thirty-four states and two Canadian provinces, and
could by reasonable attention be expected to extend throughout
the United States and Canada, a covenant not to engage in the
business unlimited in extent was sustained.
CONTRACTS NOT TO COMPETE AFTER A TERM OF EMPLOYMENT
Contracts by an employe not to compete with his employer
during the term of employment are not dealt with here. They
involve entirely different considerations from a contract not to
compete after a term of employment. The former are never
treated as illegal restraints of trade,"5 yet equity refuses to enforce
these negative covenants not to work for another than the em-
ployer during the term unless the services are of a peculiar or
unique character.""
"Trenton Potteries Co. v. Olyphant, 58 N. J. Eq. 507, 43 AtI. 723, 46 L. R.
A. 255 (1899). The court says: "Appellant contends that such contracts were
reasonably required to protect it, not only in the areas in which the business
it purchased of respondents had been carried on, but also in other states to which
it might extend that business. But this contention I deem to be inadmissible."
"Wyder v. Milhomme, supra note 75. Covenant held too extensive, as it
covered a "territory many times larger than the actual or reasonably expected
fields of operations of the covenantee." See also Kochenrath v. Christman, 18o
Ky. 799, 203 S. W. 738 (1918).
8227 Fed. 588 (C. C. A., 7th, I9I5).
' A contract by an employee not to compete with the employer during the
term of employment is never objectionable as in restraint of trade. In Coming
v. Carr, 167 Mass. 548, 46 N. E. 117 (1897), a contract by defendant to employ
the plaintiff if he would give up his business and enter the defendant's service
in the same occupation, it was held that although it restrained the plaiixtiff
from engaging in business, it was not in restraint of trade, as the restraint was
only to continue while the plaintiff was in the defendant's employment. See also
Harrison v. Glucose Sugar Refining Co., i16 Fed. 304 (C. C. A. 7th, 1902);
Knapp v. S. Jarvis Adams Co., supra note 32; Bossert v. S. Jarvis Adams
Co., I5 Fed. l15 (C. C. A. 6th, 19o5); Robinson & Co. v. Heuer [18981 2 Ch.
455-
, In the following cases injunctions were issued on a showing that the
services were unique: Lumley v. Wagner, i De G. M. & G. 6o4 (Eng. 1852) ;
Kieth v. Kellermann, 169 Fed. 196 (C. C. S. D. N. Y., 19o9); Comstock v.
Lopokowa, 19o Fed. 599 (C. C. S. D. N. Y., 1911); Tribune Asso. v. Simonds,
io4 AtI. 386 (N. J. 1918) ; S. C. Posner Co. v. Jackson, 223 N. Y. 325, i1g N. E.
573 (i918) ; Daly v. Smith, 6 Jones & S. 158 (N. Y., 1874). In the following
the injunction was refused because the services were not unique: Burney v.
Ryle, 9x Ga. 701, 17 S. E. 986 (1893) ; Rosenstein v. Zentz, i18 Md. 564, 85 At.
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With respect to contracts not t6 compete after a term of
employment, the objection that the services are not unique or
peculiar does not prevail in equity; but the question of difficulty is
whether the contract constitutes an illegal restraint of trade. The
disposition of courts to be more reluctant to sustain agreements
which form part of a contract of employment than to sustain
similar agreements attached to a sale has been criticised, and it
has been asserted that no distinction should exist between the
two.87 Thus in Eureka Laundry Co. v. Long88 the court asks:
"Does it make any substantial difference whether the
thing of a value bargained for is contained in a contract of
sale, or in a contract of hiring? If it is lawful and proper
to protect a business just about to be acquired from certain
acts by the seller, who is familiar with such business, why is
it not equally lawful and proper to profect an established
business from such acts by one who has become familiar
therewith? We perceive no difference in principle. The
purchaser says to the seller: 'You are familiar with this busi-
ness. You know your customers; your personal acquaintance
with them is such that you could divert their trade from me
if you saw fit. Now, I will purchase your business upon
the express condition that you will agree for a limited length
of time not to engage in a like business in this locality; at
the expiration of that time I shall know my business and my
customers well enough to be able to protect myself.' So the
owner of an established business says to a prospective em-
ploye: 'In the employment, you will become familiar with
the customers of my business in a way that I cannot; you
will meet them frequently, while I see them rarely, if ever.
Now, I will hire you upon the express condition that you will
agree for a limited length of time not to solicit trade from
such of my customers as you may have supplied while in my
employ, and will not engage in my business within a limited
675 (1912) ; W. J. Johnson Co. v. Hunt, 142 N. Y. 621, 37 N E. 564 (1894) ;
Geo. A. Kessler & Co. v. Chappelle, 73 App. Div. 477, 77 N. Y. Supp. 285
(i9o) ; Hammerstein v. Mann, 137 App. Div. 58o, 122 N. Y. Supp. 276 (igIo) ;
Cort v. Lassard, i8 Or. 221, 22 Pac. 1054 (I889) ; Columbia College v. Tunberg,
64 Wash. ig, ii6 Pac. 28o (i9ii) ; Chain Belt Co. v. Von Spreckelsen, z17 Wis.
Io6, 94 N. W. 78 (I9O3).
" WH.STON, CONTRACTS, § 1643: ". • . the distinction . . . seems
inadvisable as a positive rule of law. . . . The ultimate question should be
the same in both cases."
U:I46 Wis. 205, 131 N. W. 412 (IgII).
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time, in the territory you have occupied; at the end of that
time my new employes will be sufficiently well acquainted
with my customers to protect my business.' Why is not one
contract as valid as the other ?"
It is admitted that the objections to the validity of the con-
tract, namely, the divestment by the promisor of the means of
earning a livelihood and of supporting himself and family, and
the deprivation of the community of the benefit of his services
and competition, are more likely truly to exist in the case of the
employee than in the case of the seller of a business, since the
employee from whom such a covenant is exacted is more likely to
be an expert with little knowledge or skill in other kinds of work
than is an ordinary seller. But it is urged that this difference in
the weight of the objections is not sufficient to differentiate the
cases.8 9  This assumption, that the distinction, if any, must rest
in the difference in the objectionable nature of the restraints
imposed, ignores an important difference in the nature of the
interests sought to be protected and for the protection of which
the restraint is imposed.
The interests which promises ancillary to a term of employ-
ment are appropriate to protect are much more restricted than are
the interests which promises made in connection with a sale pro-
tect. It is submitted that this difference in the nature of the inter-
ests involved justifies the position which the majority of courts
take in being "less disposed to sustain an agreement which forms
part of a contract of employment" 90 than where it is part of a
sale. It is true that the promises in each case may facilitate a sale
in the one, that of a business, and in the other, that of services;
WH.MsToN, 10c. cit. supra: "Courts are less disposed to sustain an agree-
ment which forms part of a contract of employment to refrain from subse-
quently engaging in competitive occupation than where a similar agreement is
attached to a contract of sale. There is likely to be greater hardship to the
promisor and therefore injury to the public in the former case, as for instance
where an employee, expert in a narrow and technical specialty, engages not to
practice his specialty. The distinction, however, seems unadvisable as a posi-
tive rule of law. If it is rightful to protect a business when it is purchased itshould be lawful to protect an established business from injury by an employee,
unless circumstances of great hardship exist. The ultimate question should be
the same in both cases, what is necessary for the protection of the 
promisee'srights and is rot injurious to the public."
w Supra note 89.
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and that there is a strong public policy favoring facility of trans-
fer of such interests. But the promise in the one case serves a
purpose distinct from that served in the other. In the sale of
a business the promise not to compete, and its performance,
may be necessary to secure an adequate delivery to the pur-
chaser of the thing sold; but not so in the sale of services.
The services are completely delivered without the aid of any
restraint on the promisor after he leaves the employment. The
promise not to compete is not made to protect the thing trans-
ferred, but to protect the employer from damage being done to
that which he already has, by reason of the employee's peculiar
opportunity afforded by the employment of accomplishing such
injury. More specifically, the employer is entitled to be free
from having his customers deflected or his trade secrets exposed
or used by others by reason of the acquaintanceship with them
which the employee has gained through his employment. It
is reasonably clear on principle that the employer can gain no
added power of restraint over the employee by virtue of the
employment, but can only protect his business from the inroads
which the confidential relationship enables the employee to make.
There are dicta and decisions which observe this distinction be-
tween promises ancillary to a sale and those ancillary to a term
of employment, and carefully define the extent of restraint pos-
sible in the latter case. In Morris v. Saxelby,9' where there was
little or no evidence that the defendant employee ever came in
contact with the plaintiff's customers or was ever entrusted with
trade secrets, a covenant by the employee, providing that he would
not "during a period of seven years from the date of his ceasing
to be employed by the company . . . either in Great Britain
or Ireland" engage in the business which his employer carried on,
was held invalid. The court after discussing the case of the sale
of the goodwill of a business said:
"It is quite different in the case of an employer taking
such a covenant from his employee or apprentice. The good-
will of his business is, under the conditions in which we live,
necessarily subject to the competition of all persons (includ-
'S [1916] A. C. 688.
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ing the servant or apprentice) who choose to engage in a sim-
ilar trade. The employer in such a case is not endeavoring
to protect what he has, but to gain a special advantage which
he could not otherwise secure. I cannot find any case in
which such a covenant against competition by a servant or
apprentice has, as such, ever been upheld by the court.
Wherever such covenants have been upheld it has been on
the ground not that the servant or apprentice would by rea-
son of his employment or training obtain the skill and knowl-
edge necessary to equip him as a possible competitor in the
trade, but that he might obtain such personal knowledge of
and influence over the customers of his employer, or such an
acqaintance with his employer's trade secrets, as would en-
able him, if competition were allowed, to take advantage of
his employer's trade connection or utilize information con-
fidentially obtained." 92
If the restraint is no more than is reasonably necessary to
protect the employer against the deflection of customers or misuse
of trade secrets by the employee through the opportunity which
his employment has given him, the courts uniformly uphold the
covenant 11 and give relief either at law or in equity. But the
"Supra note 91, at 7o9. The court notes that in W. C. Leng & Co. v.
Andrews [gog] i Ch. 763, a covenant by a newspaper reporter who did not
come in contact with the covenantee's customers, not to engage in the work of a
reporter in a limited area, was held invalid; and it then proceeds; "In Mason
v. Provident Clothing and Supply Co., [1913] A. C. 724, it was argued, appar-
ently for the first time in this class of case, that an employer might reasonably
say, 'I will not have the skill and knowledge acquired in my employment im-
parted to my trade rivals,' and that the validity of the restraint did not depend
upon personal contact with the employer's customers, but upon the fact that
the employe gained that general knowledge which put him into a position to
compete with his master and made him a source of danger, against which the
master was entitled to protect himself. This argument was rejected by your
Lordships' House, and the restraint in question was held bad, as being wider
than was necessary to protect the employer from injury by misuse of the em-
ploye's acquaintance with customers or knowledge of trade secrets."
"Hulse v. Bonsack Mach. Co., 65 Fed. 864 (C. C. A. 4th, 1895) ; Carter v.
Alling, Knapp v. S. Jarvis Adams Co., both supra note 32; Bossert v. Lane, 135
Fed. l15 (C. C. A. 6th, 1905) ; Freudenthal v. Espey, 45 Colo. 488, 1o2 Pac.
280 (19o9) ; Styles v. Lyon, 87 Conn. 28, 86 Atl. 564 (913) ; Am. Ice Co. v.
Lynch, 74 N. J. Eq. 298, 7o Atl. 138 (i9o8) ; Owl Laundry Co. v. Banks, 83 N.
J. Eq. 230, 89 Atl. 1055 (1914); Golden Cruller & Doughnut Co. v. Masher,
123 Atl. I5O (N. J., 1923) ; Sarco Co. v. Gulliver, 129 AtI. 399 (N. J., 1925) ;
Eastern N. Y. Wet Wash Laundry Co. v. Abrahams, 173 App. Div. 788, i6o
N. Y. Supp. 69 (1916); Clark Paper & Mfg. Co. v. Stenacker, 100 Misc. 173,
165 N. Y. Supp. 367 (1917); A. Finkenberg's Sont v. Adest, 203 App. Div. 631,
197 N. Y. Supp. 246 (1922); New York Linen Supply & Laundry Co. V4.
Schachter, 125 Misc. 805, 212 N. Y. Supp. 72 (1925) ; Fralich v. Despar, I65
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promise by the employee not to compete will be bad if the restraint
is more extensive territorially than is reasonably necessary to pro-
tect the employer's business, i. e., if it extends beyond the limits
to which the business actually extends or by reasonable allowance
may be extended,9 4 or if the restraint is for a length of time not
needed to protect the employer's business.9 5 Nor will equity enjoin
the breach of a negative covenant not to enter into the employ-
ment of a competitor, where the purpose is to prevent the em-
ployee from quitting the employer's service and not to prevent
use of detrimental information gained through employment.9"
Pa. 26, 30 AUt. 521 (1894) ; Stoflet v. Stoflet, 16o Pa. 532, 28 At. 857 (1894);
Turner v. Abbott, ixI6 Tenn. 718.94 S. W. 64 (19o6); Eureka Ldy. Co. v. Long,
146 Wis. 205, 131 N. W. 412 (ig1); Jewel Tea Co. v. Novak, 146 Wis. 224,
131 N. W. 415 (1911).
"The Samuel Stores v. Aaron H. Abrams, 94 Conn. 248, io8 AUt. 541
(igig); Simms v. Burnette, 55 Fla. 702, 46 So. 9o (19o8); Victor Chemical
Works v. Iliff, 299 Ill. 532, 132 N. E. 8o6 (i921); Sherman v. Pfefferkorn,
241 Mass. 468, 135 N. E. 568 (1922) ; Grand Union Tea Co. v. Levitsky, 153
Mich. 244, 116 N. W. 1o9o (19o8); Osius v. Hinchman, 15o Mich 603, 114
N. W. 402 (igo8); Dow Chemical Co. v. Am. Bromine Co., 21o Mich. 262,
177 N. W. 996 (1920); Mallinckrodt Chemical Works v. Nemnich, 169 Mo.
389, 69 S. W. 355 (igo2) ; Steinmeyer v. Phenix Cheese Co., gi N. J. L. 351,
1O2 Atl. 15o (1917); Kaumagraph Co. v. Stampagraph Co., 235 N. Y. I, 138
N. E. 485 (923); Hammerstein v. Mann, 137 App. Div. 58o, 122 N. Y. Supp.
276 (Igio); Magid v. Tannenbaum, 164 App. Div. 142, 149 N. Y. Supp. 445
(1914); Gilbert v. Wilmer, 1O2 Misc. 388, 168 N. Y. Supp. 1o43 (igi8);
Kaunagraph Co. v. Stampagraph, 197 App. Div. 66, 188 N. Y. Supp. 678
(1921) ; Keeler v. Taylor, 53 Pa. 467 (1866) ; Iron City Laundry Co. v. Leyton,
55 Pa. Super. 93 (913) ; Chain Belt Co. v. Spreckelsen, 117 Wis. io6, 94 N. W.
78 (igo3).
'A. Booth & Co. v. Davis, 127 Fed. 875, mod. 131 Fed. 31 (C. C. A. 6th,
1904); Tuscaloosa Ice Mfg. Co. v. Williams, 127 Ala. 110, 28 So. 669 (i9oo);
Sauser v. Kearney, 147 Iowa 335, 126 N. W. 322 (i9io) ; Keene Syndicate v.
Wichita Gas, Electric & Power Co., 69 Kan. 284, 76 Pac. 834 (1904) ; Barrone
v. Mosely Bros., I44 Ky. 698, 139 S. W. 869 (ig1); Conemaugh Gas Co. v.
Jackson Fame Gas Co., i86 Pa. 443, 40 Atl. iooo (i898); Boggs v. Friend.
77 W. Va. 494, 87 S. E. 876 (igi6); Kradwell v. Thiesen, 131 Wis. 97, III
N. W. 233 (907).
"Clark Paper Co. v. Stenacher, 236 N. Y. 312, 140 N. E. 708 (1922).
